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Federal sentencing enhancements force federal courts to delve into the world of
substantive state criminal law. Does a state assault statute require violent force or
just offensive touching? Does a state burglary statute that criminalizes breaking
into a car or a house require prosecutors to charge the location entered as an ele-
ment? Whether a person with prior convictions convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) faces a minimum sentence of fifteen years and a maximum of life impris-
onment rather than a maximum sentence of ten years turns upon the answers to
these questions. Yet, state law often does not resolve the uncertainties which exist at
the edges of their criminal code. When a federal sentence turns upon a state crime,
these uncertainties must be resolved by federal judges, leaving federal courts in the
position of attempting to prophesize state law. As a result, two problems arise: a
federal court may get a particular case wrong, sentencing a defendant to a sentence
not properly applicable, and federal courts may split on the meaning of a state law,
with no opportunity to get an authoritative ruling unless the precise issue arises in
a new state case. There is a better way.
This problem was faced once before, in the civil context. An elegant solution
was found: certification. The already constructed certification framework can and
should be utilized by federal courts facing unclear, unsettled, or unencountered
questions of substantive state criminal law. This would solve the federalism and
accuracy problems currently inherent in federal sentencing based upon prior state
conviction.
INTRODUCTION
Federal criminal sentences are often enhanced for offenders
with prior convictions of certain types. Whether through the en-
hancements of Chapter Four of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines or statutes like the Armed Career Criminal Act, codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), offenders may receive much higher sentences
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than their crime and criminal history otherwise authorize or re-
quire. To trigger the enhancements a person must have prior
convictions for either violent felonies or serious drug offenses.
What constitutes a violent felony or a serious drug offense is a ques-
tion of federal law.
The definitions of these categories present questions of law for
federal courts. When the predicate crimes are federal, the federal
court must consider the definitional question and whether the stat-
ute meets the definition. Federal courts are empowered to answer
both questions authoritatively. But prior state convictions can also
provide the requisite conditions for enhancement. When the predi-
cate convictions are under state rather than federal law, federal
courts must determine whether the state offense falls within the
federal category. This often requires the federal court to determine
not only the bounds of the federal definition but also the limits of
the state statute. Such a determination creates a federalism prob-
lem: when federal courts engage in routine interpretation of state
law, they often consider questions involving the previously unex-
plored boundaries of given state crimes. This Note suggests a
solution: importing certification from the civil context into the
criminal sentencing context. This modest suggestion does not solve
all of the problems present in these enhancements. But unlike
other proposed solutions, certification can be implemented imme-
diately either by the judiciary alone or in partnership with litigants.
This Note primarily examines the Armed Career Criminal Act.
However, the solution also applies to other contexts where the cate-
gorical approach is used, such as the Sentencing Guidelines.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the structure of
and jurisprudence surrounding the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), the categorical approach required by the Supreme Court,
and the federalism problem inherent in applying this approach.
Part II discusses the development of certification in the civil context
and examines the literature surrounding its successes and failures.
Part III shows that certification can apply in the criminal sentencing
context through certification statutes as written and that any issues
with certification in the categorical approach do not cause enough
concern to avoid certifying predicate sentencing questions.
I. THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT’S CURRENT OPERATION
CREATES AN UNTENABLE FEDERALISM PROBLEM.
This Part explains the Act in question, the procedure for apply-
ing it, and the problem which this Note seeks to address. Section A
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introduces the statutory language of the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA) and provides a brief overview of the jurisprudence sur-
rounding the Act. Section B explains the categorical approach to
deciding whether a given crime fits one of the definitions explained
in Section A. Finally, Section C discusses how the categorical ap-
proach requires federal courts to determine the outside boundaries
of state crimes and thus causes a significant federalism problem.
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act
Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), ACCA provides that if “a person
[ ] violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convic-
tions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both,
committed on occasions different from one another,” that person is
subject to a 15-year minimum sentence as opposed to the ordinary
10-year maximum sentence for violations of § 922(g).1 Central to
the statute are the definitions of “serious drug offense” and “violent
felony.” A serious drug offense is defined as:
i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act, the Con-
trolled Substances Import and Export Act, or chapter 705
of title 46 . . . ; or
ii) an offense under [s]tate law involving manufacturing, dis-
tributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture a
controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is proscribed by law.2
Typically, ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” is split into three
clauses: the force clause, the enumerated offenses clause, and the
residual clause. The “force clause” comprises crimes that have “as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another . . . .”3 The second clause con-
tains enumerated offenses, which Congress declared per se violent—
“burglary, arson, or extortion, [or any offense which] involves use
of explosives.”4 Finally, the “residual clause” includes all conduct
that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”5
1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012) (citations omitted).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012); United States v. Davis, 487 F.3d 282, 285 (5th
Cir. 2007) (explaining the names given to the three clauses).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
5. Id.; Davis, 487 F.3d at 285.
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The residual clause’s vagueness has been the subject of five Su-
preme Court cases.6 In the final case, Johnson II, the Court held
“that the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the
residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites ar-
bitrary enforcement by judges.”7 The Court held “that imposing an
increased sentence under the residual clause of the [ACCA] vio-
lates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”8 Thus, the
definition of violent felony is now narrowed to the enumerated of-
fenses and the force clause.9
By the time the Supreme Court voided the residual clause, it had
already clarified the definitions of the enumerated offenses and the
meaning of the force clause. Five years prior, in Johnson v. United
States (Johnson I),10 the Court held that in the context of ACCA’s
force clause, “‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force ca-
pable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”11 The
force clause, therefore, requires a crime to have as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of
another capable of causing physical pain or injury.
In Taylor v. United States12 the Court explained that the enumer-
ated offenses are not determined by whether the state codified the
offense according to the names presented in ACCA.13 Rather, the
enumerated offenses are used in “the generic sense in which the
term is now used in the criminal codes of most [s]tates.”14 Thus for
a crime to be burglary in the meaning of ACCA, it must contain “at
least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into,
6. Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Sykes v. United States,
564 U.S. 1 (2011); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
7. Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
8. Id. at 2563 (overruling both Sykes and James).
9. Id. (the Court’s “decision [did] not call into question [the] application of the
[ACCA] to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a vio-
lent felony.”). Notably, the ACCA differs from the Career Offender Guidelines in this area, as
“the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a due process vagueness challenge.”
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 897 (2017). Therefore, the identically worded
residual clause of those Guidelines was not unconstitutional. Id. However, the Sentencing
Commission removed the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause in an amendment effective
in late 2017, further lengthening the list of enumerated offenses. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2–3 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20160121_RF.pdf.
10. 559 U.S. 133 (2010).
11. Id. at 140.
12. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
13. See id. at 590–92.
14. Id. at 598.
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or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to com-
mit a crime.”15 These generic definitions provide standards as clear,
if not clearer, than the definition of the force clause.
B. The Categorical Approach
Although the standards are fairly well settled, courts are still left
with the task of deciding whether an individual crime meets the
definition of violent felony or serious drug offense. In Taylor, the
Supreme Court held that courts must use a “formal categorical ap-
proach” to make this determination.16 The categorical approach
“requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and
the statutory definition of the prior offense.”17 Thus, the categorical
approach requires courts to look solely to the statutory elements of
the predicate crime to determine whether it meets the definition of
an enumerated offense or one of the other standards.18 To render
the standard another way, the categorical approach requires that a
person must engage in conduct constituting a violent felony or seri-
ous drug offense to violate a given statute. For example, even if a
given defendant used force sufficient to satisfy the force clause, if
his crime is charged under an assault statute that also, indivisibly,
criminalizes offensive touching, the assault is not a predicate
offense.
A wrinkle in the otherwise straightforward categorical approach
arises where a statute lists “elements in the alternative, and thereby
define[s] multiple crimes.”19 In these circumstances, the Supreme
Court has allowed a “modified categorical approach” in which
courts are permitted to look “to a limited class of documents . . . to
determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was con-
victed of.”20 Thus, a court may use an individual case’s documents
to look not to the defendant’s conduct, but to whether the defen-
dant was charged with the version of the crime which is
categorically a violent felony or serious drug offense.
However, not all alternatively phrased statutes present different
elements—some list multiple ways of fulfilling a single element.21
15. Id. (footnote omitted).
16. Id. at 600.
17. Id. at 602.
18. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016).
19. Id. at 2249.
20. Id.; see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (specifying which documents
may be used for this purpose).
21. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.
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For example, if a burglary statute proscribes unlawful entry into a
building or enclosed field with intent to commit a crime, it is not
immediately clear whether the “building or enclosed field” phrases
two elements or one element with two means. The question turns
on whether the jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant entered “a building or an enclosed field” or
if the jury could convict although some jurors believed the defen-
dant entered an enclosed field and others believed it was a
building.22 Thus, when faced with an alternatively phrased statute,
courts face a preliminary question of whether the alternatives are
means or elements. Only if they are elements is the modified cate-
gorical approach applied.23
The final question is which body decides what a given statute
means. For example, the determination of what elements are in-
cluded in a criminal statute is, at the first order, determined by the
legislature, with any lack of clarity resolved in the courts. Where a
federal statute is at issue, the federal court system is more than qual-
ified and empowered to engage in statutory interpretation.24
However, the situation is different when a defendant was convicted
of a state offense. All federal courts, up to and including the Su-
preme Court, are bound by a state’s highest court’s “interpretation
of state law, including its determination of the elements of” a
crime.25
In sum, a federal court applying ACCA takes two steps. First, it
determines what the elements of the predicate offense were when
the defendant was convicted.26 Second, it evaluates whether those
elements meet any of the standards under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) for
violent felonies or serious drug offenses.27 If they do, the penalty
applies.28
22. See id. (distinguishing statutes that set forth means from those that set forth ele-
ments, noting that in the former category “a jury need not make any specific findings (or a
defendant admissions) on that score.”).
23. Id. at 2256.
24. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000) (holding that Article III of the Con-
stitution grants the federal judiciary an “independent responsibility—independent from its
coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent from the separate authority
of the several States—to interpret federal law.”).
25. Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2009).
26. See United States v. Giggey, 589 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2009).
27. See Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 138.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
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C. The Federalism Problem Inherent in the Categorical Approach
A federal court therefore has to interpret state law to apply
ACCA. But how is a federal court to determine what a state statute
means? With a certainty only possible from a court possessing dis-
cretionary review, the Supreme Court claimed that in many cases it
will be “easy” because there will be “a state court decision [which]
definitively answers the question.”29 In practice, however, the issue
may be a bit more difficult. It is true that where there is a case
directly on point, the question is easy. For the question to be defini-
tively answered, however, the highest court in a state must have
directly confronted abstract questions about the boundaries of
criminal statutes. For example: What is the minimum degree of
force necessary to violate the statute? How serious does an offer for
the sale of drugs have to be to violate the statute? Is “structure”
defined more broadly by the statute than in the generic Taylor
formulation?
There is no guarantee that a state court will have ever had the
opportunity to answer these questions. In fact, the very foundations
of our judicial system run against probing the outer edges of a
crime. Prosecutorial discretion combined with incentives for prose-
cutors to avoid potential loses, the ubiquity of plea bargains in
criminal law, and the lack of incentives for defendants to test the
boundaries of the law with their conduct all operate to curb the
opportunities for answers. On one side, the prosecutor may wish to
avoid a costly trial and appellate process where the law is unclear.
On the other, the defendant has a strong reason to plead to a crime
with a lower sentence, especially if there is little doubt that the pros-
ecutor would be able to secure a conviction on the lesser-included
offense.30 For instance, where it is unclear whether a defendant
used the requisite amount of force for robbery, both the prosecu-
tion and defendant have an incentive to enter a plea deal for
larceny.
Furthermore, state versions of the case or controversy require-
ment ensure that courts may not bindingly hold on the boundaries
of the law when the question is not directly put to them.31 There-
fore, so long as parties are avoiding the hard questions, state courts
29. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
30. The most recent Department of Justice data show that ninety-four percent of state
felons sentenced in 2006 pleaded guilty. Sean Rosenmerkel et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Felony
Sentences In State Courts, 2006 Statistical Tables, NAT’L JUD. REPORTING PROGRAM, Dec. 2009, at
1, 25 tbl. 4.1 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
31. The vast majority of States do not allow for advisory opinions to be issued absent a
request from the legislature or executive branch of the state. See generally Jonathon D. Persky,
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have no opportunity to clarify the law. And of course, legislatures
are free to change or update the laws, meaning that if a court has
yet to consider the newest iteration of a law, its precedent may not
apply.
When faced with an unclear question of state law, a federal court
can either guess correctly how the state court would rule or guess
incorrectly.32 This runs contrary to the bedrock principle of federal-
ism.33 Some of the numerous problems which arise from this
federalism tangle can be illustrated by examples drawn from cases
on ACCA or the nearly identical provision in the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines.34 Two examples serve to illustrate the
problems: United States v. Savage and United States v. Vann.35
In Savage, the Second Circuit determined that a Connecticut stat-
ute criminalizing the sale of narcotics could not serve as the basis
for a career offender enhancement.36 Citing to the Fifth Circuit, the
court adopted the interpretation that “a mere offer to sell, absent
possession, [did] not fit within the Guidelines’ definition.”37 The
court made clear that its concern was that such an offer could be
made without intent to sell—“An offer to sell can be fraudulent,
such as when one offers to sell the Brooklyn Bridge.”38 A later Sec-
ond Circuit case explained that unlike a potentially fraudulent
offer, bona fide offers “made with the intent and ability to follow
through on the transaction” would be sufficient to trigger the
Comment, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV.
1155 (2005).
32. See Sharika Robinson, Note, Right, but for the Wrong Reasons: How a Certified Question to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina Could Have Alleviated Conflicting Views and Brought Clarity to
North Carolina State Law 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 230, 230 (2012).
33. Id. at 230–31.
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1–.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
Section 4B1.1 provides a sentence enhancement for “career offenders,” those who have two
or more felony convictions for “crimes of violence” or “controlled substance offenses.” Those
phrases are defined in § 4B1.2(a) and (b) respectively. Crime of violence is defined with a
force clause identical to that of 924(e) and a longer list of enumerated offenses. “Controlled
substance offense” is defined as “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance” or its possession with “intent to manu-
facture, import, export, distribute or dispense.” While there are differences, for the purposes
of this Note, they are unimportant. What is important is that the Career Offender Guidelines
are also governed by the categorical approach. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 39 (1993).
35. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d
959 (2d Cir. 2008).
36. 524 F.3d at 964–65.
37. Id. at 965 (quoting United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 285, 288–89 (5th Cir. 2008)).
38. Id. at 965–66.
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Guidelines.39 The foregoing was simply a federal court interpreting
a federal statute.
The problem arose in the court’s understanding of Connecticut
law. Connecticut defines “sale” to include offers.40 Relying upon a
1972 Connecticut Supreme Court case,41 as well as opinions out of
the Maine, Nevada, and Illinois courts of last resort, the Second
Circuit determined that possession or control over the goods to be
sold was not a requirement.42 However, a 2013 decision by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court suggests that the Second Circuit was
wrong. In State v. Webster the Connecticut Supreme Court deter-
mined that an offer in the context of the statute should be
rendered as “the presentation of a controlled substance for accept-
ance or rejection.”43 This language, as well as the court’s rationale
more broadly, implied that an offer which served as the basis of a
Connecticut conviction for the sale of a controlled substance could
not, in fact, be fraudulent.44 At the least, Webster throws Savage’s
construction of Connecticut law into doubt. At the most, it means
that the Second Circuit’s interpretation was wrong.
What caused this situation was a combination of several problems
with federal interpretation of state law. Connecticut’s only pro-
nouncements came from a 36-year-old case—a decision that was
not even directly on point. With only that case to rely upon, the
Second Circuit was forced to speculate what the law of Connecticut
was. It appears to have guessed incorrectly.
Another example in the sentencing context that illustrates the
problems with federal interpretation of state law involves a North
Carolina statute that criminalizes taking indecent liberties with a
child. The central issue with the North Carolina statute is whether it
39. Pascual v. Holder, 723 F.3d 156, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2013); see also United States v.
Sanchez, 679 F. App’x 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining that Pascaul’s logic applies to the
Sentencing Guidelines context.).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-240(50) (2013); State v. Wassil, 658 A.2d 548, 556–57
(Conn. 1995).
41. State v. Brown, 301 A.2d 547 (Conn. 1972).
42. Savage, 542 F.3d at 965. The other states’ courts were used to show that similar lan-
guage at common law meant mere offers to sell. Id. The court did not offer any support for
its contention that a person need not have the means or intent to go through with the sale
for it to be criminal under Connecticut law aside from the fact that possession was irrelevant.
Id.
43. 60 A.3d 259, 265 (Conn. 2013).
44. See id. at 267 (noting that a jury could have found that the defendant “presented the
[drug] in his hand for [the offeree’s] acceptance, or at least indicated that it was available for
sale . . . .”). This language, in the context of explaining what constitutes an “offer,” implies
that a completely fictitious offer would not be enough, placing great weight on the apparent
ability and intent to complete the sale.
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criminalizes multiple offenses, and so warrants the modified cate-
gorical approach, or whether it criminalizes only one offense.45
Sharika Robinson provides an in-depth analysis of how the Fourth
Circuit was thrown into a state of confusion by the statute in Vann,
and why that turmoil should prompt North Carolina to adopt a cer-
tification statute. Robinson explains that the en banc panel of the
Fourth Circuit “could not reconcile its views, particularly because
the North Carolina court’s interpretation of the [statute was] ob-
scure.”46 Ultimately, the majority concluded that the elements were
set out in the alternative, so the modified categorical approach was
appropriate.47
Vann brought to light the issue of conformity across jurisdictions
that arises when a state court has not addressed an issue directly.48
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits faced the same issue with
the same statute.49 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits concluded that
the modified categorical approach was not appropriate.50 Like the
Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit applied the modified categorical
approach.51
The problems illustrated by this circuit split fall into two catego-
ries: violations of federalism and inconsistencies in the federal
courts. The federalism problems are more numerous. One problem
is that if the federal court is incorrect, a state court might be forced
to contradict the federal court’s reasoning.52 Another problem ex-
ists where a state court releases a later decision which is inconsistent
with assumptions made in the federal court’s reasoning, creating
confusion about the continuing validity of the federal court’s deci-
sion. Or, lower state courts (and for that matter, lawyers) seeking
the correct meaning of a statute might look to the federal court’s
interpretation for guidance, undermining the central principle that
state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law.53
45. See Robinson, supra note 32 at 244–45.
46. Id. at 245.
47. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 817 (4th Cir. 2011).
48. The ACCA and Career Offender Guidelines are focused on prior convictions. As
such, many different jurisdictions may have reason to consider the meaning of a criminal law
from one state.
49. United States v. Galarza-Bautista, 585 Fed.App’x 744 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Ramirez-Garcia, 646 F.3d 778 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270
(5th Cir. 2008).
50. Robinson, supra note 32 at 247–48, 48 n.148.
51. Galarza-Bautista, 585 Fed. App’x at 745.
52. Robinson, supra note 32 at 231.
53. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (“Neither [the Supreme] Court nor
any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute differ-
ent from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.”).
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The problem with federal uniformity is more difficult. Circuit
splits may be exacerbated by procedural rules within the circuits.54
Yet, the Supreme Court should not be resolving circuit splits on
interpretations of state law because there is no reason to suppose
that it will have a better grasp of state law than the circuits. But a
circuit court’s decision cannot be directly appealed to a state’s high-
est court—the body with the final authority to say what the correct
answer is.
Combined, the two problems make the categorical approach ex-
tremely problematic—both through a breakdown of federalism and
an interference with the uniformity of the federal court system.
Thus, the current use of the categorical approach undermines the
workings of the judicial system both vertically and horizontally.
While a difficult problem, this is not a problem without a solution.
Indeed, it is a problem faced and solved before—all that is neces-
sary is to apply that solution here.
II. CERTIFICATION IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT
The issue of state law interpretation in federal courts has long
existed in the context of diversity jurisdiction for civil cases. This
Part explains the origins of this problem in the civil context and its
parallels to the ACCA context in Section A, and Section B discusses
how interjurisdictional certified questions (hereinafter “certified
questions”) provided a definitive solution. Section C briefly ad-
dresses the arguments against certification and the responses by
proponents of certification. Ultimately, this Part seeks to explain
how certification addresses the same problems in the civil context
that ACCA faces, and to preview the pitfalls of certification in prep-
aration for Part III, which will detail how certification could solve
the issues in ACCA.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Difficulties
Ascertaining State Law
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,55 the Supreme Court famously
held, “[t]here is no federal general common law.”56 Thus, for cases
54. See, e.g., Ryan Walters, Note, Raise it or Waive it? Addressing the Federal and State Split in
Authority on Whether a Conviction Under an Unconstitutional Statute is a Jurisdictional Defect, 62
BAYLOR L. REV. 909, 935–36 (2010) (discussing the “law of the circuit” rule).
55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. Id. at 78.
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before a federal court on diversity jurisdiction “the law to be ap-
plied in any case is the law of the state.”57 This landmark decision
served to restore “uniformity in the administration of the law of the
state . . . ,” which the prior doctrine had undermined.58
However, Erie created a new problem: “how should federal courts
ascertain state law in cases where it is unclear?”59 The Court itself
did not attempt to divine the state law at issue in Erie, but instead
remanded to the circuit court.60 Subsequent cases established that
federal courts hearing a case through diversity jurisdiction are, “in
effect, only another court of the [s]tate.”61 However, “no matter
how seasoned the judgment of the [federal] court may be, it cannot
escape being a forecast rather than a determination” where state
law is unsettled.62 Thus, the federal court must “look to analogous
state court decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of sister
states, learned treatises and public policy considerations identified
in state decisional law in order to make an ‘informed prophecy’ of
how the state court would rule on the precise issue.”63 In the civil
context, a further and more complex difficulty can arise when
choice of law forces a federal court to prophesize how the court of
last resort of one state would guess how the courts of another state
would interpret its law.64
If these procedures sound like guesswork, that is because they
are.65 And, as in the ACCA context, litigants are unable to directly
appeal the decision of the federal court to the state court for the
final say.66 One judge on a state court of last resort explained: “Fed-
eral judges generally do not have as much experience with state law
as their state counterparts . . . . Incorrect predictions [of state law
can] detract from the role of the state high court in declaring the
57. Id.
58. Id. at 75.
59. Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions
in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 376 (2000).
60. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
61. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
62. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
63. Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Blinzler v.
Marriot Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 59, 378 (“As Judge Henry J. Friendly observed in such
a situation, ‘[o]ur principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the
New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which
neither has thought.’”) (quoting Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir.
1960)).
65. John R. Brown, Certification—Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 455, 455 (1977)
(“[T]he federal judge must often trade his judicial robes for the garb of the prophet.”).
66. See id. at 456 (noting “the frustration for litigants when the rule of law [the federal
court] prescribe[s] turns out to be a ticket for one ride only.”).
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law of the state and hamper orderly development of the law.”67 In
other words, the same issues that manifest in the ACCA context also
manifest in the civil context.68
B. Certification as a Solution
State actors and federal courts have had ample opportunities to
seek solutions to this problem throughout the nearly eighty years
since Erie. In 1945, Florida broke new ground with a statute al-
lowing federal courts to certify questions of law to the Florida
Supreme Court.69 However, because the Fifth Circuit was “either
unaware of it or apprehensive in its use,” the statute was completely
unused for fifteen years.70 In 1960, however, the Supreme Court
praised the “rare foresight” of the Florida Legislature in passing the
statute, and instructed the Fifth Circuit to certify a question on re-
mand.71 This decision “[u]nshackled” the certification of questions
and the Fifth Circuit began to “frequently use[ ]” the procedure in
Florida.72 With further approval by the Supreme Court,73 certifica-
tion procedures were ultimately adopted in forty-nine states.74
67. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 59, 378–79. Chief Judge Kaye served on the New York
Court of Appeals from 1983 until 2008. Sam Roberts, Judith S. Kaye, First Woman to Serve as
New York’s Chief Judge, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
01/08/nyregion/judith-s-kaye-first-woman-to-serve-as-new-yorks-chief-judge-dies-at-77.html?m
cubz=3&_r=1.
68. The ACCA context may actually suffer more acutely. Every force clause case asks
about the minimum amount of force necessary to violate the statute, every divisibility ques-
tion about wheat is an element rather than a means. E.g. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2243, 2257 (2016); Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 137–38 (2010)). By
contrast, not every case before a federal court by virtue of diversity jurisdiction will ask ques-
tions about the limits of state law.
69. 1945 Fla. Laws. Ch. 23098, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1998)). The statute
officially provided only that “the Supreme Court of Florida may devise rules to govern such
certifications,” and no promulgation occurred for at least 15 years. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
363 U.S. 207, 212 n.3 (1960). The Supreme Court, however, declared that “[i]t is not to be
assumed . . . that such rules are a jurisdictional requirement for the entertainment by the
Florida Supreme Court . . . .” Id.
70. Brown, supra note 65, at 457.
71. Clay, 363 U.S. at 212.
72. Brown, supra note 65, at 457, 459.
73. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 59, 382–86 (discussing multiple Supreme Court
cases approving of certification).
74. Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine Comity: Certification (At Last) in North Carolina, 58 DUKE
L.J. 69, 71 (2008). As the title of Eisenberg’s article suggests, the lone holdout is North Caro-
lina. An additional complication is notable: despite adopting official certification procedures,
the Missouri Supreme Court has held that the Missouri Constitution forbids it from answer-
ing a certified question. Grantham v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1
(Mo. July 13, 1990) (en banc); Id. at 71 n.13.
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There are commonalities among the procedures of certification,
but the particulars vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For the
purposes of this Note, a high-level gloss will suffice. Certification “is
a procedure by which an inferior court is able to obtain from a
defining court a conclusive answer to a material question of law.”75
When interpreting state law, federal courts are “inferior” to state
courts of last resort because the federal courts’ decisions are not the
ultimate interpretation. The provisions of the Uniform Certifica-
tion of Questions of Law Act of 1995 are illustrative of the laws
actually enacted. Section 3 of that Act empowers the highest court
of a state to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the
United States . . . if the answer may be determinative of an issue in
pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling
appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this
State.”76 Importantly, while the Uniform Law would allow a state
court to answer the question of any federal court, a minority of ju-
risdictions will only accept certified questions from appellate
courts.77 Even if it comes from a proper certifying court, the state
court may also choose to not answer such a question.78
Certified questions are in no way “advisory.” The certifying court
must provide the court with a question of law and the facts behind
the question.79 Many jurisdictions either require or permit the par-
ties to brief the issue, and some allow oral argument.80 In so doing,
certification proceedings may “bear[ ] the hallmarks of the adver-
sarial system and the purported benefits that follow.”81
Although numbers may vary jurisdiction to jurisdiction,82 Kaye
and Weissman provided a window into the first fifteen years of New
75. Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 39 IOWA L. REV. 629, 629–30 (1951)
(footnote omitted).
76. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1995).
77. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 59, at 396. When Kaye and Weissman’s article was
published in 2000, thirty-six jurisdictions allowed certified questions from federal district
courts. Id.
78. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3, § 3 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1995).
79. Id. at § 6(a)(1)–(2).
80. Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for an Inter-
Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2131 (1999).
81. William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and Jurispru-
dential Reasons Why New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 491,
522 (1998).
82. Indeed, given the size of New York, the development of the law, and its refusal to
hear cases from district courts, the numbers in New York may be fairly low. Ohio, which
allows Federal District Courts to certify questions, saw fifty-five cases during the almost thir-
teen years following its adoption of certification. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court
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York’s experience with certification.83 During that time, forty-five
questions were certified by federal appellate courts, almost all of
them by the Second Circuit.84 The New York Court of Appeals
agreed to answer thirty-nine, two of which were withdrawn, de-
clined five, and had one pending when the article was published.85
Between 1990 and 1994, nationwide federal appellate courts certi-
fied 120 questions, 119 of which were answered, and federal district
courts certified 171, 165 of which were answered.86
C. The Debate Over Certification
Like most doctrines, certification has its proponents and detrac-
tors. Although both sides of the debate make important points,
empirical studies have repeatedly shown that the “overwhelming
majority” of judges find that certification is useful, that the disad-
vantages of certification procedures are not significant, and that the
disadvantages that do exist are outweighed by the benefits.87 In ad-
dition to its support within the judiciary, certification enjoys
significant support from legal commentators as well as institutions
such as the American Law Institute and the Judicial Administration
Division of the American Bar Association.88
This list of support is not meant to undermine the detractors’
objections, but rather to present their arguments as those of a vocal
minority. Their concerns must be taken seriously, especially as
some apply with special significance in the ACCA context. Con-
versely, some do not naturally transfer from civil trials to criminal
sentencing.
In challenging the “sacred cow in our modern judicial barnyard,”
Judge Selya of the First Circuit argued that certification had “not
lived up to its promise” and had “been plagued by theoretical and
practical difficulties since its inception . . . .”89 In concluding that
Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS.
157, 169 (2013).
83. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 59, at 397.
84. Id. Specifically, forty-four questions came from the Second Circuit and one came
from the Eleventh. Id.
85. Id.
86. JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW:
FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 35 (1995).
87. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 505–07 (describing empirical studies of
certification).
88. Id. at 496–97.
89. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677,
678, 691 (1995).
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“neither federalism nor efficiency nor fairness” justifies certifica-
tion,90 Judge Selya’s critique weaves together four of the main
concerns with certification: delay and expense, burdening state
court dockets, impairing the development of state law, and the
claim that certified questions are advisory or otherwise too
abstract.91
The arguments about the delay (and thus expense) that accom-
panies certification are largely empirical. The average time a
litigant spends waiting for an answer is around six months.92 How-
ever, there have certainly been instances where the delay has been
longer. Judge Selya noted a six-year delay in one case, and a greater
than two-year wait for a plurality opinion refusing to answer the
question in another.93 A six-month delay is certainly reasonable in
light of the time the parties spend briefing the issues and the court
writing its decision.94 And although six years is certainly unreasona-
ble, the low average wait time suggests that this problem is often
overstated.95
Critics charge that “[c]ertified questions also add to the work-
load of the responding court” and use “scarce judicial resources to
tackle . . . ‘somebody else’s problem.’”96 But the actual use of certifi-
cation suggests that “the certification floodgates have not opened as
feared.”97 There are two reasons this concern has not manifested:
the discretion of federal courts and the discretion of state courts.98
Federal courts do not certify questions “automatically or unthink-
ingly” but rather do so with “much judgment, restraint and
90. Id. at 691.
91. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 509–10 (discussing the concerns with certifi-
cation). A fifth concern raised in Bassler & Potenza article is the interaction between
certification and state constitutions. Obviously, if state constitutions forbade certification, it
would no longer be an attractive solution for the problems posed by ACCA. However, thus
far only one state constitution appears to. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
92. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 511 (listing the median time as “approximately
six months”); Eisenberg, supra note 74, at 77–78 (citing a study that found the mean time to
be 6.6 months). As Eisenberg notes, this is the average for appeals courts’ requests, while the
study found the average for district courts to be 8.2 months. Id; see also Kaye & Weissman,
supra note 59, at 397 (“The average time from certification to acceptance or rejection [in
New York] has been approximately six weeks, and the average time from acceptance to reso-
lution about six months.”).
93. Selya, supra note 89, at 681 n.18 (citing Wood v. City of E. Providence, 811 F.2d 677,
678 (1st Cir. 1987) and Cuesnogle v. Ramos, 835 F.2d 1486, 1489–90 (1st Cir. 1987)).
94. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 511–12.
95. John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 411, 456–57 (1988).
96. Selya, supra note 89, at 682.
97. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 514.
98. See id. (attributing the unopened “certification floodgates” to, inter alia, federal and
state court discretion).
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discretion . . . .”99 The result is that federal courts exercise their
power to certify “sparingly.”100 This is likely due not only to their
respect for the state courts’ time, but also because the federal
courts, aware of the delay, have no desire to see their own dockets
congested.101 After federal courts exercise discretion in certifying a
question, the state court is free to decline them. Thus, even if the
federal courts were poor gatekeepers, the state “court will always
have a means to control its caseload . . . .”102
A third criticism peculiarly argues that the state courts benefit
from federal courts prognosticating on state law. Critics suggest that
the benefit to state courts is the federal courts’ insight into their
precedent and law.103 This “cross-pollination” occurs when federal
courts “anticipate” the changes state law will make, and “their pro-
nouncements of state law echo beyond the case at hand and
influence positively the course of state law development.”104 While
this may sound appealing, it ignores the state’s sovereignty and
right to have the final say on its law, and it creates significant confu-
sion to have two sovereigns interpreting the same law.105
A gentler version of this critique argues that federal courts gain
“more understanding[ ] and a healthier respect for state courts”
when the federal court assumes the state court’s task.106 While
Judge Selya is certain that “[t]he risks are very small” when federal
courts do not certify a question,107 that is cold comfort to the plain-
tiff denied restitution or the defendant bankrupted by a federal
misinterpretation of state law. Recognizing this, Judge Selya points
out that “this argument only goes so far; such a litigant is no more
99. Brown, supra note 65, at 458 (quoting Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975)).
100. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 514.
101. Id. at 514 n.118.
102. Smith, supra note 80, at 2146.
103. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 317, 324 (1977); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior,
and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 367, 372, 386 (1980) (“[W]e find that the fed-
eral courts in diversity cases appear to make a significant contribution to the continuing
development of the common law.”).
104. Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV.
305, 339–40 (1994). Yonover’s view is informed by his position that federal judges are more
competent than state judges both due to the federal appointment processes and as a matter
of substantive familiarity with the law. Id. at 336–37. Bassler & Potenza had the following
response: “Needless to say, this is a view which the authors, including the one having the
most pertinent experience (Judge Bassler has sat both as a federal judge and a judge of the
Superior Court of New Jersey), strongly disagree.” Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 516
n.124.
105. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 517.
106. Selya, supra note 89, at 687.
107. Id.
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greatly disadvantaged than a litigant who loses in a lower state court
and is thereafter denied discretionary review, only to have the
[S]tate’s high court decide the issue favorably in some other case at
a later date.”108 Noting that there is no right to be heard by the
ultimate authority, Judge Selya concludes that “[f]airness, as a ratio-
nale for certification, does not take us very far.”109
With due respect to Judge Selya, he has ignored the ability to
present the question to the court of last resort. Absent certification,
a litigant arguing state law in the federal courts will get a final an-
swer, while a litigant in the state courts may petition to get the final
answer. There is a difference between a state high court refusing to
hear a case and never being able to request the hearing. Fairness, it
seems, takes us further than Judge Selya recognized.
A final line of attack is based upon the premise that certified
questions are advisory opinions: “[T]he advisory nature of certified
questions poses a psychological barrier to enthusiastic engagement
with the issues. The view that certified questions present a live case
and controversy to the responding court requires judges to accept a
fiction that may prove difficult to swallow.”110 This concern is
shared by a substantial minority of judges. An empirical study found
that two-thirds of the judges surveyed did not see certified questions
as advisory opinions, while the other third did.111 Proponents of cer-
tification respond that the problems raised by advisory opinions are
simply not present with certification, as most of the benefits of the
adversarial system exist when the court answers a certified ques-
tion.112 The adversaries often argue the question, orally or written,
and there are very real consequences of the decision with a negative
impact on one party.113
Certification in the civil context has proven a much lauded and
successful procedure in defusing the problems created by Erie. Its
critics, while raising significant points, do not present a compelling
enough argument to abandon it—all that stands in the way of the
entire country having certified questions is the legislature of North
Carolina and the Supreme Court of Missouri.114 The remaining
108. Id. at 690.
109. Id. at 691.
110. Id. at 682.
111. Corr & Robbins, supra note 95, at 447, 455. A Kentucky Justice, however, succinctly
responded to the question of whether the advantages of certification outweighed its disad-
vantages: “No. Our experience had been that only advisory opinions have been rendered.”
Id. at 468.
112. See, e.g., Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 521–22; Corr & Robbins, supra note 95,
at 455–56; Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 83–85; Smith, supra note 80, at 2138–41.
113. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 81, at 522.
114. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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question is whether this solution can be successfully duplicated in
the ACCA context.
III. CERTIFICATION IN THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH CONTEXT
The accuracy provided and federalism preserved by certification
in the Erie context could easily be imported to the ACCA context.
The legislative framework already exists—the courts need only use
it. By certifying questions of law, the federal courts could ensure
that a given statute is actually divisible, that a given felony contains
the amount of violence they believe it to, and that a particular drug
offense requires a bona fide offer. Section A explains how the al-
ready-extant certification statutes allow for certification in the
ACCA context. Section B considers whether the claimed problems
with certification manifest in the categorical approach context and
whether there are problems unique to that context. Finally, Section
C addresses what problems are not solved with this approach.
It is difficult to say as an empirical matter that no federal court
has certified a criminal sentencing question it faced under the cate-
gorical approach. But it is clear that courts do not see certification
as a method for dealing with criminal sentencing issues. In Mathis v.
United States,115 the Supreme Court sought to support its claim that
the “threshold inquiry [for whether a statute sets forth elements or
means] is easy in this case, as it will be in many others.”116 Seeking
to show the ease of determining state law, the Court stated that
judges would have three sources from which they might easily de-
termine the answer: state court decisions; the statute itself; and
using the “peek” method, by looking briefly to the record docu-
ments to see how a given crime was charged.117 However, it did not
mention the option presented in this Note—simply asking the state
court. Granted, where there is a decision on point (as there was in
Mathis118) no such certification is necessary. But it would certainly
lead to greater certainty and clarity than the “peek” method the
Court endorses.119 At least one federal court of appeals also does
115. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
116. Id. at 2256.
117. Id. at 2256–57.
118. Id. at 2256.
119. The “peek” method is likely to prove highly inaccurate, and not just as compared to
certification. Different prosecutors may charge an offense or fashion jury instructions differ-
ently, so some may concede that a statute sets out elements while others may argue that it lays
out only means. If defenders and prosecutors are strategic at the federal level, they may bring
a case to the federal courts of appeals only when the documents below support their favored
reading. The court of appeals would, per Mathis, peek at those documents and make a ruling,
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not seem to view certification as an option, but rather feel that they
are bound to “make an informed prophecy as to the state court’s
likely stance.”120 If any court has used certification while engaging
in the categorical approach, it would be an outlier. Neither the Su-
preme Court nor lower courts seem to recognize certification as an
option, let alone a solution. This Note proposes that courts should
do so with little hesitation, and see certification as the preferred
alternative where no state law yet definitively answers the question.
A. Already Extant Certification Statutes Allow for
Certification of ACCA Questions
The language of certification statutes and rules fall broadly into
two categories with respect to the requirements for the law certi-
fied. One group of states only allows for certification “if the answer
is determinative of the cause.”121 Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“cause” as “[a] lawsuit; a case.”122 “Case,” in turn, means “[a] civil or
criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law . . . .”123
Given that the question of state law would be determinative of the
case, insofar as it would control the length of sentence, these stat-
utes should still allow the state court to answer the certified
question. This group of states adopted almost word for word the
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act of 1967, while the
second group patterned their statutes on the 1995 revision.124
but the ruling would likely be fashioned broadly (i.e., burglary under the Iowa statute from
Mathis is not divisible). This ruling would then hold even in cases where the charging docu-
ments would suggest the opposite conclusion. In other words, the federal court would believe
it had ascertained a definitive answer to state law when in fact there was a significant split.
This would cause a substantial amount of injustice. It may come as no surprise that I would
suggest instead of ever using the peek method, the court should certify the question for a
binding and determinative answer.
120. United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Andrew Robin-
son Int’l., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2008)).
121. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(a); see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 15-2-9 (2015 & Supp. 2017); HAW.
R. APP. P. 13; IDAHO R. APP. 12.3; MISS. SUP. CT. R. 21.
122. Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This is the only definition that fits
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. “Cause” may also mean “something that produces an effect
or result” or “[a] ground for legal action . . . .” Id.
123. Case, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
124. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1995); UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1 (NAT’L CON-
FERENCE ON COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1967); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(a) (copying the 1967
Act); Legislative Fact Sheet—Certification of Questions of Law (1995), UNIFORM L.COMM., http://
www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Certification%20Of%20Questions%20
of%20Law%20(1995) (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) (listing states that adopted the 1995 Act).
FALL 2017] Restoring Comity 261
The second group uses more permissive language, merely requir-
ing that the question of state law “could determine the outcome of
a matter pending in the requesting court”125 or “that determinative
questions of [state] law are involved in a case pending before [the
certifying] court.”126 This more lax requirement for what the ques-
tion determines would allow any issue which turns on state law or is
determinative of any proceeding to be certified. In these jurisdic-
tions, the fact that the matter is a criminal sentencing as opposed to
a civil action makes no difference on the face of the statute.
Thus, the statutes already in place allow for certification in the
criminal context as well as the civil. Indeed, on at least two occa-
sions, federal courts have utilized certification in habeas corpus
cases.127 The legislative and executive branches need not take any
further action; the judiciary, on its own, may simply use the frame-
work the other branches created for it.
B. Issues Certifying Categorical Approach Questions
The fact that certification in the criminal categorical context pro-
vides increased clarity and is easily implemented must be measured
against the costs of implementation. A starting point for examining
the potential negatives are the criticisms which have been levied
against certification in the civil context.
Some problems simply are not as problematic. A delay of several
months is less of a difficulty for someone convicted of being a felon
in possession of a firearm than it might be for a civil litigant. To be
eligible for ACCA enhancements, a convict is necessarily eligible
also for a ten-year maximum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).128
Although the Career Offender Guidelines may present a different
situation, the fact remains that the delay in sentencing ultimately is
125. CAL. R. CT. 8.548(a); see, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
1861 (2016 & Supp. 2017); N.Y. CT. R. 500.27(a); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1A-3 (LexisNexis
2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-106 (West 2017).
126. N.Y. CT. R. 500.27(a).
127. See Shea v. Heggie, 624 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1980); Adams v. Murphy, 653 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1979). A federal court also certified a criminal issue in Noble v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
82 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir., 1996), but the court certified the criminal issue to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals rather than a state court, id. at 1113.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) (“Whoever knowing violates subsection . . . (g) . . .
of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.”). Data from 2012 indicate that 95.6% of offenders convicted under § 922(g) were
imprisoned, with three quarters serving twenty-four months or less. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 1 (n.d.), https://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Felon_in_Posses
sion_of_a_Firearm.pdf.
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just the service of part of the sentence.129 The parties should find
the delay palatable in exchange for the certainty.
However, the expense question remains. Presumably, it would be
more costly for both parties to brief and argue the question of state
law before the state court. But, as it stands, the parties would need
to brief the questions already. The added expense likely would not
be great, certainly not great enough to outweigh the benefits of
certification. In the criminal context, the expense may never be
enough to outweigh the benefits. The primary reason is that the
financial burden of criminal litigation falls upon the government—
the prosecutor will always be a federal employee, and they will often
be opposed by a government-employed federal defender. In the
civil context, litigants may be deterred from certifying questions of
law in a purely cost-benefit analysis. When the case is criminal, how-
ever, the prosecutor is focused not only on the instant case but also
on ensuring the law’s development for the next case. If the defense
attorney is public, they share this concern. Many private defense
attorneys will as well. But if not, their client’s liberty interest is still
greater than money, and so the defense remains less likely to be
deterred by expense.
This use of certified questions would not only avoid the impair-
ment of state law, but would actually serve to develop it. State courts
often do not have opportunities to examine the outer boundaries
of statutes, and, as discussed above, other actors have little reason to
test them. By certifying questions of law for categorical purposes,
the murky edges of criminal law could be defined. Furthermore,
these opinions would not be merely advisory or too abstract. Parties
with interests of the highest nature, liberty and justice, will be
fiercely litigating the issues with all the benefits and energy of the
adversary system.
The concern about overburdening the state, however, exists with
special significance in this context. It would be easy to note that
there are a limited number of criminal statutes, and a limited num-
ber of essential questions of state law. Once a state has determined
that a burglary statute, for example, is divisible in the meaning of
Mathis, the issue would be settled. Were we living in a different
time, such a contention would show that certification in this con-
text would, in fact, burden state courts less than in the Erie context.
The Armed Career Criminal Act, however, takes us out of the realm
129. See Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 n.9 (2016) (noting that while de-
fendants may be incarcerated post-conviction, “postconviction incarceration is considered
punishment for the offense [and so] a defendant will ordinarily earn time-served credit for
any period of presentencing detention.”).
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of ordinary times. Johnson II and Welch v. United States exemplified
an opening of the floodgates by allowing for retroactive collateral
ACCA challenges.130 If this flood reaches the state courts, it might
overwhelm them. All this suggests, however, is that while the Johnson
II challenges are pending, federal courts should control the
amount of questions actually certified. Once this flare up wears
down, they can certify more. Alternatively, the state courts could
face the flood now and leave no question unanswered, allowing the
federal courts to never darken their dockets again (at least in this
context). That certification is discretionary, however, for both the
federal and state courts can still serve as a check until this tumultu-
ous time is over.
Beyond the problems in Erie, there are some additional problems
that the categorical approach creates. One issue is timing. By their
nature, sentencing enhancements for prior convictions may involve
laws that have since been reformed or repealed. Thus, the incen-
tives are lower for a state court to answer the question: why
interpret a repealed statute? The double discretion of federal and
state courts in deciding, respectively, whether to certify and
whether to answer should be used here. Federal courts simply
should not certify repealed statutes unless they are facing a signifi-
cant number of cases where the statute is implicated. The same
logic suggests not certifying statutes which have been substantially
revised. The state courts may simply decline to answer should they
receive such a request. In either type of case, the litigants would be
in no worse position than they are under the current practice.
A second problem is that predicate offense cases may involve
prior convictions from multiple jurisdictions. ACCA requires three
convictions for a sentence to be enhanced. But one convict may
have far more qualifying convictions. Suppose a given individual
has been convicted of five separate burglaries in five states. Some
states may already have answered whether their crime is defined
more broadly than the generic Taylor definition, and if so whether
it is divisible such that the court may still determine if a particular
individual’s conviction falls within the generic definition. If three of
the five convictions clearly qualify, no issue is presented. But, if only
two are clearly identified, the court would need to decide whether
to certify all three other offenses or certify only one at a time. From
130. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016) (holding that Johnson II applies
retroactively on collateral review); Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2263
(2014) (striking down the residual clause of ACCA). The Career Offender Guidelines will
not face the same type of overwhelming flood following Johnson II because no part of the
definition has been struck down. Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 897 (2017).
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the perspective of accuracy and avoiding undue delay, certifying all
three questions would be ideal, but if all federal courts did this,
state courts might be overwhelmed. Additionally, if the certifying
court is a federal district court, it may not be able to certify to a
given jurisdiction: some states only answer questions from appellate
courts.131
In such a case, the federal court should nonetheless certify ques-
tions to all jurisdictions that will accept them. By certifying all
questions at once, the court ensures that there will be only one de-
lay period. If the court instead certifies one question, waits to hear
the response, and certifies the next question, delays will run consec-
utively and create too long of a wait. Additionally, the limited
number of criminal statutes that could qualify as predicates results
in a limited number of possible questions. Once the state court has
answered the question once, it will not need to do so again. It is
preferable to have these questions answered definitively early so
that other federal courts (not to mention state courts and criminal
attorneys) receive clarity quickly. A federal district court could then
engage in guesswork to determine the answers to unclear questions
for jurisdictions which decline to answer the question or to which it
may not certify only when there are not sufficient predicates.
A final issue specific to the criminal categorical approach is the
potentially shifting standards. Taylor, the two Johnson cases, and
Mathis demonstrate that the Supreme Court has settled many of the
questions in the ACCA context, but overruling is always possible.132
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has yet to definitively determine
the limits of what constitutes a “serious drug crime.” As discussed
above, the federal courts of appeals have converged on a definition
with the “bona fide offer” requirement, but that requirement could
be simply rejected by the Supreme Court. There is a federal stan-
dard being applied whenever a federal court decides one of these
cases. It is perfectly permissible to certify the question of state law,
but what the question is may differ.133 For example, under the cur-
rent offer to sell drug standard, the federal courts would ask: “Does
131. See, e.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(a) (“On either its own motion or that of a party, the
Supreme Court of the United States or a United States court of appeals may certify. . . ques-
tions of law . . . .”).
132. Indeed, Johnson II overruled a line of Supreme Court precedent not even ten years
old. 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
133. By this I mean the question that is entirely state law, questions such as “How much
force does robbery require?” “Is breaking into a car burglary under this statute?” “Must the
prosecutor charge these different things as elements, or are they simply means?” I do not
mean to suggest that it would be appropriate for the federal court to ask, “Does this statute
require violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another?” The state court
should be asked only to provide the input—the federal court must still apply the standard.
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this statute criminalize offers to sell drugs which are fraudulent, or
only offers ‘made with the intent and ability to follow through on
the transaction?’”134 But if they ask that question for ten years, re-
ceive answers from most jurisdictions, and thus have settled law,
nothing prevents the Supreme Court from creating a new standard,
for example, requiring that an offer is allowed only where the de-
fendant had the immediate ability to follow through with the
transaction. Suddenly, there is a different question.
This problem cannot exist in the Erie context, where no federal
standard is applied. Here, it creates a new danger: multiple rounds
of sudden short bursts of certification whenever the Supreme Court
changes federal standard. But, this is still preferable than the alter-
native. There will already be a flurry of activity in federal courts,
and the federalism and accuracy dangers that go with it justify pass-
ing some of that activity along to the state courts.
C. The Problems Left Unsolved
This Note proposes a solution that is more patch than panacea.
The aim of using certification in the ACCA context is to ameliorate
the federalism and accuracy problems inherent in applying a cate-
gorical approach to determine whether state law meets a federal
definition. There are two problems in particular that are left unan-
swered by this Note.
First is the broad moral and policy question: Should we have
these mandatory enhancements at all? Much has been written
about the wisdom (or lack thereof) of enhancements like ACCA.135
This Note is explicitly neutral on that question. The fact is that we
have such enhancements and lawyers and judges must navigate
them. This Note is focused on patching the immediate problem,
rather than the larger policy question.
The second problem is the seeming lack of clarity and consis-
tency within the doctrinal web that the Supreme Court has woven
around ACCA. As one federal circuit court of appeals recently
noted while considering a Career Offender Guidelines case:
Even a careful reader of this opinion may at this point feel lost.
We began with a seemingly simple question. Has Tavares been
134. Pascual v. Holder, 723 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2013) (providing the quoted standard).
135. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PEN-
ALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ch. 5 (2011) (discussing the debate
surrounding these kinds of enhancements), https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-
reports/2011-report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminal-justice-system.
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convicted of a crime of violence? Trying to answer that ques-
tion then led us down several rabbit holes: Is Massachusetts
ABDW a divisible offense under Descamps [v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2276 (2013),] and Mathis [v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016)]? How does Massachusetts law define the relationship
between the two common forms of the offense? Does Voisine v.
[United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016),] upend the circuits’
wide consensus that recklessly causing injury is different than
using force against a person?136
The solution proposed in this Note will not entirely dismantle the
“Rube Goldberg of jurisprudence of abstractions piled on top of
one another in a manner that renders doubtful anyone’s confi-
dence in predicting what will pop out at the end.”137 But, it will fill
in the first and second rabbit hole referenced in Tavares. And, it
enables the judiciary to better ensure certainty in cases to come.
The First Circuit would have been surer of the questions of Massa-
chusetts law, even though it would still have been left with some
thorny questions of federal law.138
The advantage of this proposal over other proposed solutions is
its pragmatism and immediate applicability. Scholars suggesting
complete solutions must propose legislative action.139 A complete
solution may ultimately be desirable. However, this Note proposes a
solution that litigants and judges may put into practice today, with-
out further action from any legislature. It can thus immediately
solve some of the issues created by the categorical approach.
CONCLUSION
Certification is ready and waiting to be applied in the criminal
sentencing, categorical approach context. It would not fix all of the
136. United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2016).
137. Id.
138. See generally Daija M. Page, Forcing the Issue: An Examination of Johnson v. United
States, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1191 (2011) (arguing that the force clause is ambiguously drafted
and the Supreme Court was incorrect in its interpretation of that clause in Johnson v. United
States (Johnson I), 599 U.S. 133 (2010)).
139. Avi M. Kupfer, Note, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career Crimi-
nal Act Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014) (proposing that Congress delegate to
federal agencies the ability to create a binding list of predicate felonies.); see also Tavares, 843
F.3d at 19 (the First Circuit endorsed a federally created “list of state and federal laws
deemed to be crimes of violence that warranted the desired penalties and sentencing
enhancements.”).
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problems present with the current way that federal courts apply sen-
tencing enhancements for state predicate convictions. But it would
ensure that such a system does not damage federalism and that in-
dividual defendants are receiving sentences that correspond with
Congress’s intentions in creating these sentencing enhancements.
State court dockets should be respected and not overwhelmed
with certification requests. But, should federal courts begin to cer-
tify in this context, state courts will be able to answer all of the open
questions in their jurisdictions fairly quickly. Moving forward, certi-
fication would only be necessary where the federal courts change
the standard, where the state adopts or revises a criminal statute, or
where the state court reinterprets one.
The ability to ensure accuracy in the deprivation of liberty of a
person and the faithfulness to the principles of federalism would
outweigh even a greater burden on state courts. Certification is an
available remedy to these issues. For this reform to take effect, all
that is necessary is for litigants to ask for it or federal courts to start
using it.
